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 Abstract: Beginning with President Carter and continuing with each successive 
president, the federal bench has become more diverse.  This has caused scholars to turn 
their attention to how personal characteristics such as race and sex affect judging.  
Understanding the effects of gender and race on judging is crucial because white female 
and minority female judges may bring a different perspective to the bench than their 
male counterparts due to their shared experiences with discrimination.  To fill a gap in 
the literature, this study examines the impact of women in terms of legal influence and 
voting behavior.  The results demonstrate that women are cited more often than their 
male counterparts when they author sex discrimination cases but not abortion or cases 
concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA cases).  However, I do not find 
significant differences in legal influence or voting behavior in any area when white 
women and minority women are compared.  In sex discrimination and abortion cases, 
female judges’ voting behavior was similar to their same-party male colleagues.  Only in 
ADA cases did I find Republican women were more liberal than their male counterparts.      
 
 
 Lay Summary: Beginning with President Carter and continuing with each 
successive president, the federal bench has become more diverse.  Researchers and 
scholars have turned their attention to how personal characteristics such as race and sex 
affect judging.  Understanding the effects of gender and race on judging is crucial 
because white female and minority female judges may bring a different perspective to 
the bench than their male counterparts due to their shared experiences with 
discrimination.  To fill a gap in the literature, this study examines the impact of women 
in terms of legal influence (measured by citations of majority opinions) and voting 
behavior.  The results demonstrate that women are cited more often than their male 
counterparts when they author sex discrimination cases but not abortion or ADA cases.  
However, I do not find significant differences in legal influence or voting behavior in any 
area when white women and minority women are compared.  In sex discrimination and 
abortion cases, female judges’ voting behavior was similar to their same-party male 
colleagues.  Only in ADA cases did I find Republican women were more liberal than 
their male counterparts.  These results offer insight into the importance of studying race 
and gender (and their intersection) in the federal judiciary system.  With more 
minorities gaining seats on the federal bench, judicial policy-making could become more 




During a speech at the Berkley School of Law in 2002, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
spoke of the transforming judiciary she had seen over the course of her career.  “I have 
seen a quantum leap in the representation of women…in the legal profession and 
particularly in the judiciary” (Sotomayor 2002).  While Sotomayor acknowledges the 
federal judiciary for its successful diversification efforts, she also points out that the 
addition of federal female judges is still slow and infrequent.  She cited the small 
number of women, especially minority women, currently sitting on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  Perhaps the most shocking statement made in her speech was one addressing 
how the experiences of women and people of color will “affect our decisions,” a bold 
statement given the notion that the judiciary is supposedly impartial.  However, she 
calls this impartiality “aspirational,” as it is true that a person’s experiences can have an 
effect on how they cast a vote (Sotomayor 2002).  Sotomayor’s speech highlights several 
important reasons why scholars should take a broad view of judicial diversity and its 
impact.   
One of the most important areas of concern when studying the judicial system is 
the disjuncture between how judges decide cases in reality versus how people believe 
judges should decide cases.  People believe judges should be completely impartial when 
deciding a case and in a perfect system that would occur.  However, judges are human 
beings and their ideological and personal values will interact with how they decide a 
case (Spaeth 2002).  The latter perspective is known as the attitudinal model, which is 
used to explain judges’ votes in the process of judicial decision making.  While many 
judges believe that they adhere to one of the facets of the legal model (e.g., adhering to 
precedent, plain meaning, framers’ intent, or balancing social interests), they often 
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accuse fellow judges of deciding a case based on their policy preferences (Spaeth 2002).  
This demonstrates that judicial decision making may not be as impartial as some 
believe. 
As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, white and minority women have slowly come 
to earn a seat on a federal bench, bringing different viewpoints and experiences to many 
areas of law.  Race and gender, observed together and by themselves, can impact 
professional opportunities available to attorneys. As many judges who have come to sit 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals had prior experience in a private law firm setting, it is 
important to note that (minority) female attorneys face “significant disadvantages in 
advancement,” (Collins, Dumas, and Moyer 2016).  For example, “A black woman 
partner from a major Chicago firm noted that she had been taken for a court reporter at 
every deposition she had ever attended” (Rhode 1994, 65).  White and minority women 
generally have taken a different path to the federal bench than white males.  Women 
who were among the first group to attend law school attended top-tier law schools 
before moving onto private practice.   
Examining President Carter’s appointees, Elliot Slotnick (1983) discovered that 
48.5% of women were graduates of elite law schools while only 39.9% of male 
appointees graduated from the same type of institution.  As Judge Ilana Rovner stated 
“You know, the young women today can’t possibly ... understand the pressures of being 
first ... Nothing was good enough, and it took me an awful lot of years to realize how 
good many of the women really were in relationship to the men’s talents. I mean, when I 
think of it, men that were hundreds of places below us in class were getting great jobs 
and there were no jobs for us,” (Moyer and Haire 2015).  This statement demonstrates 
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how women who were among the first to graduate law school struggled finding a job 
simply because they were a woman.     
Work experience also differed between white and minority women and white 
men.  White and minority women (and minority men) were more likely to work in 
various levels of government while white men were more likely to have private practice 
experience.  This is due in part to an executive order issued by President Johnson that 
“commanded them [private firms] to hire women and minorities,” (Haire and Moyer 
2015).  Federal Judge Mary Schroder recalled, “I had my pick of all the best government 
jobs,” because government agencies went to the major law schools looking for minorities 
to hire after the executive order (Haire and Moyer 2015).  However, this does not mean 
women did not have any private practice experience.  Of the female minority appointees, 
three of nine did not have any private practice experience (Haire and Moyer 2015).  
While white men’s professional backgrounds were more concentrated in the realm of 
private practice, their academic accomplishments were sometimes less than their white 
and minority women counterparts (Haire and Moyer 2015). 
However, the most striking difference between white male and female 
experiences in law occurred in the workplace.  These differences were most apparent to 
working mothers.  For instance, when Federal Judge Mary Schroeder learned she was 
pregnant in the 1970s, she was advised by a senior lawyer her to keep her pregnancy a 
secret for as long as possible.  She responded to this by saying “Well, I’ll see how long I 
can stay a little bit pregnant.”  This only lasted for four months; when she showed up in 
a maternity dress, lawyers around the office started talking and saying “We told you so” 
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(Haire and Moyer 2015).  This demonstrates the discriminatory manner in which 
women were treated in the workplace simply for being women. 
This study builds on existing research to examine areas that have received less 
attention with respect to women’s impact on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: sex 
discrimination (including pregnancy discrimination) and abortion.  I look at two facets 
of impact: legal influence (as measured by citations to majority opinions) and voting 
behavior.  
Below, I begin by identifying existing trends in voting and influence in women’s 
rights cases from 1993 until 2008, as well as highlighting areas that have not garnered 
as much attention in the research. I will lay out the overall structure of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, followed by a discussion of gender composition within the courts and the 
barriers women faced coming into the realm of judicial politics.  Following that, I 
discuss voting, on an individual level.  Next, I examine intersectionality within the 
courts.  Finally, I conclude with citation influence analysis of female judges.  For this, I 
use the Federal Judiciary Center and the U.S Courts of Appeals Multi-user Database to 
gather citation counts of opinions authored by females in the three salient areas. My 
findings suggest that women have begun to make strides on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
by becoming influential policy-makers in sex discrimination cases, but are less 
influential in other kinds of cases.  Furthermore, minority females vote in similar ways 
to their white female colleagues when deciding sex discrimination and abortion cases.  
Finally, my findings suggest that female judges’ voting habits do not differ from their 
same-party male colleague in two of three issue areas.  Only in ADA cases were 




The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 The U.S. Courts of Appeals is the intermediate court that acts as both a reviewer 
and a filter.  It may review cases that come up from trial courts, resolving appeals from 
lower courts.  The Courts of Appeals can also set precedent within their circuit.  For 
many litigants, the US Courts of Appeals is the court of last resort because the Courts of 
Appeals hear many more cases than the US Supreme Court (the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
heard 54,244 cases in 2015 (http://www.uscourts.gov 2015) while the Supreme Court 
averages 80 cases per year (www.supremecourt.gov 2017).  Litigants who lose a federal 
district court decision are (most of the time) entitled to one appeal.  They will take their 
appeal to the US Courts of Appeals which are divided into eleven numbered districts 
that are geographically defined, with two additional courts; one designated to decide 
cases within the District of Columbia and the Federal circuit that has specialized 
jurisdiction (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014).   
The main function of the courts is to identify legal, rather than factual, errors 
made by the lower trial courts (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006).  It is 
important to have 3-judge panels rather than a single judge because the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals serves as a filter for cases that will go to the Supreme Court.  Requiring 
consensus from multiple judges reduces the number of cases that advance to the 
Supreme Court because it is more difficult to get at least two judges to agree rather than 
relying on the decision of just a single judge.  On average, there are between six and 29 
judges in a circuit and judges typically hear cases in panels of three.  If the litigant loses 
at the U.S. Courts of Appeals level, they may petition for the entire circuit’s review 
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sitting en banc or review by the Supreme Court (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014).  The 
judges then meet in conference one to three days after hearing oral arguments in which 
they give a tentative opinion.  However, the final decision and explanation, along with 
any precedent they may set must wait until the opinion is officially released.  
 The time to write and length of the opinions depends on the complexity and 
controversy associated with the issue.  For example, a study showed the average length 
for a case concerning civil rights averaged nine pages while a case concerning criminal 
or prisoner petitions averaged seven pages.  The longer opinions for civil rights cases 
could in part be due to the controversy that surrounds them; judges may feel the 
pressure to provide a more comprehensive and detailed justification for the position of 
the majority (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014). 
 One aspect of the U.S. Courts of Appeals is the crucial role the courts play in the 
creation of public policy.  Public policy is defined as “the authoritative allocation of 
values and resources” (Easton 1953).  Decisions handed down by judges allocate 
resources between the parties directly affected in the case; the enforcement of norms or 
development of legal rules can also appropriate resources or values because they can 
favor one group in society over another.  Furthermore, unless the U.S. Supreme Court 
intervenes, a circuit court’s ruling remains the precedent for all federal courts within 
that circuit’s geographic jurisdiction.  That is, a federal court outside of the declaring 
circuit’s geographic jurisdiction does not have to follow the precedent set in that circuit.  
However, a precedent could be persuasive for another circuit but judges are not forced 
to follow any precedent set forth by another circuit.  The U.S. Supreme Court can also 
resolve conflicts among circuits by making sure the national law is uniform.  However, 
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because the U.S. Courts of Appeals hear many more cases per year than the Supreme 
Court, many of their decisions are not challenged and therefore stand as precedent 
(Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006). 
Composition of the Courts 
Since President Carter’s attempts to diversify the bench in the 1970’s, one 
demographic group has benefitted more than any other: white women.  For Presidents 
Carter, Reagan, and G.H.W. Bush, diversification primarily meant white women or 
black men (Wheeler 2009).  It wasn’t until President Clinton and every subsequent 
administration where meaningful numbers of minority women were given the 
opportunity to have a seat on the bench (Haire and Moyer 2015).  Despite the increase 
of presidential appointments of female judges, these appointments still do not 
accurately reflect the number of women with law degrees in the United States.  In the 
academic year 1970-71, 91.4% of those who received their J.D.’s were male, meaning 
only 8.6% were female.  However, these numbers began to increase throughout the mid-
1980’s as females have accounted for at least 40% of the graduating class.  Since 2012 
those numbers are in the mid to high 40% range (www.americanbar.org 2012). 
The composition of the circuits also varies depending on the court.  The Ninth 
Circuit has the most women on the court with roughly 14, and the First Circuit falls in 
last with only one female judge between the years of 1978 and 2008 (Haire and Moyer 
2015).  Likewise, the Ninth is the most ethnically and racially diverse, and the First is 
the least diverse in terms of ethnicity and race (Haire and Moyer 2015). 
Barriers Facing Women on the Courts 
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 Women faced discrimination when they began attending law schools across the 
country, especially if they were among the “trailblazer” group of women who began 
attending law school in the 1950’s through the 1970’s (Moyer and Haire 2015). 
Beginning in 1970, women made up 8.6% of law school attendees.   However, those that 
entered during this time had admission applications that looked different from males 
applying to the same schools.  Overall, women who entered law school in the 1960’s 
through the 1980’s had higher undergraduate GPA’s but lower LSAT scores than their 
male counterparts.  Not only did women face prejudice in the admissions process, they 
also experienced it the classroom.  Women reported lower self-confidence and more 
experiences with gender discrimination than men (Clydesdale 2004). Oftentimes they 
were not received well by male classmates and professors, as they were seen as “taking a 
good man’s place,” and even called out by professors on “Ladies Days” within the 
university (Haire and Moyer 2015).  They even endured hazing by male students via a 
practice called “shuffling” whenever a female student walked into a room (Haire and 
Moyer 2015).  Despite these obstacles, women in the 1970’s through the 1980’s 
graduated at higher rates with better GPA’s than men (Clydesdale 2004).  
Discrimination did not stop after graduation; it continued to follow women 
through their professional lives as well.  For example, 48.5% of President Carter’s female 
appointees were graduates of top-tier law schools while 39.9% of male appointees were 
graduates of the same institutions:  a difference of almost nine percent.  The women that 
graduated from these top-tier schools also graduated at the top of their class in order to 
obtain a seat on the bench, while men did not necessarily have to be at the top of their 
class.   
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 Furthermore, women experienced discrimination from potential employers.  
Many did not want to hire women and most would only consider hiring one if they had a 
specialty that was desperately needed within the realm of law (Haire and Moyer 2015).  
Childcare was also an obstacle because it was hard to find full-time childcare for the first 
generation of female federal judges.  As efforts to diversify the bench grew, so did efforts 
to diversify the pool from which presidents chose their appointees.  While Ivy League 
educated women still received consideration, President George W. Bush expanded his 
search to include other universities such a Tulane, Emory, Akron, and Virginia, easing 
the elitist preferences of many before him and giving more women a chance to have a 
seat on the US Court of Appeals (Haire and Moyer 2015). President Bush’s step away 
from the Ivy League schools changed a decades-long tradition of choosing students with 
a similar background from the same select schools.  By expanding his appointment pool 
beyond the Ivy League, he opened the door for more ethnic minorities and persons with 
different socio-economic backgrounds. Furthermore, this could lead to different voting 
patterns among individuals because of different viewpoints stemming from different life 
experiences. 
Individual Voting 
 Research has found that, as a whole, women are more likely to cast liberal votes 
than men (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010), especially in sex discrimination cases.1  In a 
study conducted by Haire and Moyer in 2015, it was discovered that women born in or 
                                                          
1 Because the U.S. Courts of Appeals hears cases in panels of three, there is a group dynamic that can 
include different perspectives and influence.  Several studies have shown that having at least one female 
seated with two men can influence how a panel will vote, especially in sex discrimination cases (Boyd, 
Epstein, and Martin 2010; Moyer and Tankersley 2012; Moyer and Haire 2015).     
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before 1945 had the highest likelihood of casting a liberal vote in sex discrimination 
cases when compared to women born after 1945 and male judges born after 1945.  
Support for plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases is correlated with women who entered 
the legal profession during a time of “overt discrimination” of women (Haire and Moyer 
2015).  However, one cannot begin to analyze how a judge will vote in a case pertaining 
to women’s rights without first defining what constitutes a “women’s issue.” 
 Representation can be defined by two different types: descriptive and 
substantive.  As Pitkin (1964) argued in the context of legislative bodies, descriptive 
representation is described as “standing for” constituents “by virtue of a correspondence 
or connection between them.” The increase of women in the political arena over the past 
few decades has posed the question as to whether or not the increase of women has led 
to an increase of more substantive representation of women’s issues.  Substantive 
representation occurs “when legislators consciously act as agents for constituents and 
their interests,” that can be performed no matter their personal background or group 
memberships (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler 2016).  Substantive representation 
increases for women’s issues when there is a “critical mass” of women (usually about 15-
30%) in a legislature (Childs and Krook 2006).  This could include women championing 
causes for women or advocating for rights for minority groups that may or may not 
include women (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler 2016).  This type of 
representation can also be seen as “acting for” (Pitkin 1964).  However, the definition as 
to what constitutes a “woman’s issue” in politics is an area of disagreement in feminist 
scholarship.  Some issues reinforce limited stereotypes such as the notion that the 
woman is the caregiver within society while others do not represent minority women.   
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In terms of women’s issues, the concept of acting for was not always viewed as 
prevalent because women did not have a voice strong enough in politics to represent 
issues that pertained to them.  In a study conducted by Vega and Firestone in 1995, they 
found that female members of Congress have been increasingly representing women’s 
issues including legislation that called for equality in the workplace and beyond.  This 
legislation includes bills to improve women’s social, economic, and political status 
(Childs and Krook 2008; Bratton 2005).  Women’s issues in legislation can also be those 
that affect women in a different manner than men such as abortion, as well as issues 
that women are more broadly associated with including welfare, education, and health 
(Bratton 2005).  From the 97th Congress to the 102nd Congress, there was a steady 
increase in the number of bills introduced by women that contained legislation 
pertaining to women’s issues, with the expectation the trend would continue as more 
women gained a voice in politics (Vega and Firestone 1995).  This increase can be 
explained in part by the critical mass theory.  In Kanter’s 1977 book Men and Women of 
the Corporation, she explored the effect of critical masses and concluded that women 
may not “act for,” or represent women’s issues substantively until there are enough 
women to effectively advocate for and create policy.  With stronger numbers, women are 
able to form more “supportive alliances” that empower them to represent issues close to 
them (Childs and Krook 2008; Dahlerup 2006). 
The increase of women’s issues in the legislative branch through the election of 
more female members to Congress can also affect the judicial branch, especially the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.  The more laws passed pertaining to women’s issues can mean that 
there could be more challenges to said laws in court.  As the Courts of Appeals often 
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serve as a filter for cases that may go to the Supreme Court, they hear many cases 
attempting to identify and remedy any legal errors made by the lower trial courts.  With 
an increase in laws being passed pertaining to women’s issues, this may affect the 
number of cases in the pipeline related to such laws (Vega and Firestone 1995).  Vega 
and Firestone’s study also highlighted that race and ethnicity can have influence among 
other judges when deciding whether or not to support women’s issues, which could 
increase support for women’s issues as Congress becomes more ethnically diverse. 
Intersectionality 
 Minority females may bring an entirely different perspective to the bench due to 
their experiences not only as a woman but also as a racial or ethnic minority.  For 
instance, in a study of criminal appeals, it was found that minority females were the 
most liberal race-gender cohort (Collins and Moyer 2008).  Being members of two out-
groups seems to produce distinct voting behavior.  Women of color experience racism 
and sexism in different ways than their male and female counterparts respectively 
(Crenshaw 1991).  Many times, African American women and Latinas are not accounted 
for in the single axis frame used to define women’s issues, which typically represent 
white heterosexual women (Smooth 2011).   
However, in much of the literature on gender, this axis is often portrayed as 
representing all women, thus leaving out many of the marginalized and vulnerable 
minority groups.  For example, in DeGaffenreid v General Motors, the district court 
rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to bring suit against General Motors because they should 
not have been able to combine sex and race into a discrimination lawsuit to create a 
“super remedy.”  This meant that the court came to one of two conclusions: Congress 
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did not consider the fact that black women could be discriminated against as black 
women or they did not intend to protect them when discrimination was experienced 
(Crenshaw 1989).  Likewise, in Moore v Hughes Helicopter Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
approved of a district court’s rationale in a sexual discrimination case because Moore’s 
attempt to specify her race did not comply with the allegation that her employer 
discriminated “against females,” and by specifying her race she could not adequately 
represent white female employees (Crenshaw 1989).  
What many consider a “woman’s issue” does not necessarily represent all women 
(Smooth 2011).  Therefore, salient issues for white women could be different from 
salient issues for African American women.  Because of this issue gap, voting behavior 
between white and minority females may be different in terms of certain types of cases 
such as discrimination cases.  For example, minority women may be the more likely to 
vote in a liberal direction than a white female as they may have had the most experience 
with discrimination. An increase of substantive representation with respect to issues 
concerning all women is needed in order to give all women a voice in politics.  
Therefore, an intersectional approach to politics and the gender gap is one way to help 
alleviate the essentialist view of women and their voice in politics (Smooth 2011; 
Crenshaw 1989).  Over time, social scientists have embraced different methods for 
analyzing the complexity and fluidity of intersectionality by using time series analysis.  
Time series analysis “can account for changes in the status of variables over designated 
periods, which can help capture the fluctuations in the power relationships among race, 
gender, class, sexuality, and other socially constructed categories over time” (Smooth 
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2011).  This new approach can help bring trends to light that were previously not seen 
because of the single axis framework (Smooth 2011). 
The intersectionality perspective suggests that minority female women may see 
different issues as salient, compared to white women and minority men, and affect their 
voting behavior.  In the next section, I examine how judges’ identities may also affect 
their collective decision making processes. 
Influence 
In terms of politics and law, influence can take on very different forms.  For this 
study, influence is measured by the number of citations an opinion receives.  In other 
contexts, influence can be the power of persuasion.  This can be seen at the panel level 
when one or two judges change their vote after listening to another panel member 
(Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994; Moyer and Tankersley 
2012; Moyer and Haire 2015).  Finally, persuasion can be seen in an overridden 
judgement because the judge that overrode the previous decision gave thought to the 
rationale behind the decision and was not persuaded by his argument, choosing to write 
their opinion based on a different argument. 
Influence within the U.S Courts of Appeals is important because there is not just 
one judge deciding a case as with a trial court.  Wielding influence on a panel with two 
other colleagues can change the outcome of the case.  Numerous studies have shown 
that “when faced with a majority view that differs from their own, [people] not only 
adopt the majority position but they convince themselves of the truth of that position by 
considering the issue only from the majority perspective” (Nemeth and Goncalo 2004).  
This could mean influence could have short-term and long-term effects; a judge may 
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change his or her vote in a single case but they could also begin to see that area of law in 
a different way and change their behavior in the future.   
For this thesis, influence will be defined as the number of times a judge is cited by 
subsequent cases.  Female influence within the U.S. Courts of Appeals has received less 
scholarly attention than studies of decision making.  However, in a study conducted by 
Choi and colleagues (2011), female influence was tested in several areas of law by 
measuring the number of times a female judge was cited as compared to a male judge in 
the same area. They measured the number of outside state majority opinions in several 
areas of law including rights.  For this area, men were cited more often than women, but 
the difference was not statistically significant (Choi, Gulati, Holman, and Posner 2011).   
Overall, a growing number of comprehensive studies that analyze female voting 
and influence in Title VII sex discrimination cases find that female judges (no matter 
their race) are much more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff.  Many also conclude 
that females are able to persuade their male colleagues to also cast a vote in favor of the 
plaintiff (Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Moyer and 
Tankersley 2012; Moyer and Haire 2015).  Furthermore, minority female judges have 
the highest rate of liberal votes in criminal cases (Collins and Moyer 2008).  But will this 
play out differently in other issue areas? Less research has focused on individual-level 
voting differences in the areas of abortion (Oakey 2003) and disability discrimination. 
Similarly, there is limited research on how influential female judges are in these issue 





The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title VII which prohibited employers from 
“discriminating against employees on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and 
religion.”  Title VII has been very successful in helping women gain access into areas of 
employment that had been previously out of their reach such as law and medicine 
(Bartlett and Rhodes 2010).  While Title VII has helped women in the workplace, sex 
discrimination is still prevalent.  For many years, women faced outright discrimination 
in the legal profession; some were only hired if they had a specialty within law that was 
desperately needed by employers (Haire and Moyer 2015). 
Experiencing discrimination when searching for a job could potentially make 
female judges more sympathetic to plaintiffs in a sex discrimination case because they 
personally experienced discrimination on the basis of sex that prevented them from fully 
participating in society.  This leads to a liberal outcome (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 
2010; Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994).  This also lends support to the informational 
account (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010) and feminist legal theory (Songer, Davis, and 
Haire 1994) in helping explain female voting and influence on sex discrimination cases.   
Abortion 
Even after the Supreme Court’s 1973 landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion 
has remained a part of appeals’ courts dockets.  After Roe, many states responded with 
laws that restricted abortions, including laws restricting abortion in the first trimester 
more so than Roe, as well as parental consent laws, waiting periods of any duration, and 
abortion-specific informed consent provisions (Oakley 2003).   The federal courts have 
heard many challenges to these and other laws restricting access to abortion.  Overall, 
many of these restrictive acts did reduce abortion rates throughout the US as many 
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conservative decisions came down from the US Courts of Appeals.  The Supreme Court 
then upheld many of these restrictions (Oakley 2003).   
Since the 1980’s abortion is often regarded as one of the most divisive issues 
between the Republican and Democratic parties.  According to a study done by the Pew 
Research Center in 2016, Republicans have become more polarized on the issue with 
59% saying it should be illegal in all cases in 2016 compared to 48% in 1995.  Democrats 
have maintained steady numbers for support of abortion in all or most cases with 70% 
agreeing with it today and 64% agreeing in 1995. However, gender differences within 
the parties are slim: only 35% of Republican women believe abortion should be legal in 
all or most cases, while 40% of Republican men believe it should be legal.   Sixty-seven 
percent of Democratic women believe it should be legal at all times, while 75% of 
Democratic men believe it should be legal (Fingerhut 2016).  Overall, Democratic 
women are less likely than their male counterparts to support abortion in all or most 
cases.   
Party differences can also be seen on the bench.  When examining panel effects, 
Republican appointees cast a pro-choice vote 46% of the time, while Democratic 
appointees cast one 72% of the time (Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, and Sawicki 2006).  
Furthermore, Democratic appointees are more likely to change their vote if seated with 
two Republican appointees, but no change in voting was seen with Republican 
appointees when seated with two Democratic appointees (Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, 
and Sawicki 2006).  These party differences suggest that the debate on abortion is 
rooted in ideological differences rather than gender. 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
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 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a comprehensive civil rights bill 
signed by President Bush in 1990 that prohibits discrimination and allows those with 
disabilities to have “equal opportunity” under the law to “participate in the mainstream 
of American life,” (www.ada.gov 2017).  While there is some ambiguity to the language 
in the law, one must have a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities,” (www.ada.gov 2017).  As with sex discrimination and 
abortion, there have been a number of cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeal since its 
inception making it a good comparison category for this project.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, ADA cases will be used only as a comparison category because cases based on 
disability discrimination are not gender-salient issues (as sex discrimination and 
abortion cases are). 
Gender Effects 
The increase of female judges on the US Courts of Appeals have led scholars to 
develop several theories regarding gender effects on judging.  Songer, Davis, and Haire 
(1994) posit three separate effects women can have on the bench regarding search and 
seizure, obscenity, and employment discrimination cases.  One states female judges will 
be more liberal in all three areas, the second states that there will be no differences 
between men and women regarding the three areas, and the last rests on feminist legal 
theory and says that women will be more conservative than men only when deciding 
obscenity cases as it perpetuates the oppression of women.  The feminist legal theory 
(which will be discussed in this paper) states that there will be differences between male 
and female judges that are not simply liberal or conservative but rather that females will 
only be more liberal in areas of discrimination that prevented those who claimed 
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discrimination from full participation in the community.  Their research showed that 
women are only likely to be more liberal than men when deciding employment 
discrimination cases (Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994).  
 In addition to the feminist legal theory, this paper will also focus on the 
informational account as described by Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010), which states 
that “women possess unique and valuable information emanating from shared 
professional experiences,” and effects can be seen on panel issues where females possess 
“valuable expertise, experience, or information.”  This account provides the most 
support for why women are more likely to be influential when writing an opinion for sex 
discrimination or abortion cases because historically they are issues that have either 
plagued women or are strictly matters that only a woman has the possibility to face in 
their lifetime.   
Hypotheses 
 I expect influence in the three salient areas to yield three separate hypotheses.  
Because women have had professional and academic experiences different from that of 
men, it has helped shape their interpretation of statutes with respect to their 
constitutionality.   
First, I posit opinions regarding Title VII sex discrimination (including pregnancy 
discrimination) and abortion will be more influential (cited more often) if authored by a 
woman (white or minority) rather than a man (white or minority).  This could be due in 
part to the fact that these three case areas affect only females or heavily affect females 
thus making their opinion more influential.  I do not expect there to be differences in 
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ADA cases based on gender because they include cases that affect men and women 
equally.   
H1: In sex discrimination and abortion cases, opinions authored by women will 
receive more citations than male-authored opinions. 
Second, it is expected minority women will be more likely than white women to 
cast a liberal vote in sex discrimination (including pregnancy) and abortion cases.  
Because of their different experiences with racism and sexism, minority women will be 
more likely than even white women to cast a liberal vote.  As with the first hypothesis, I 
do not expect differences for ADA cases.  
H2: In sex discrimination and abortion cases, minority women will cast a 
higher proportion of liberal votes than white women. 
 Last, I expect that all female judges will be more likely than all male judges to 
support the plaintiff in sex discrimination cases because of professional experiences 
shared by many women on the bench.  However, with abortion cases, I expect voting 
differences to reflect ideology rather than gendered experiences and viewpoints.  I do 
not expect statistically significant results in this analysis for the comparison category of 
ADA cases. 
H3: The only significant differences in abortion cases will be between 
Republican and Democratic judges. 
Data and Variables 
 For this project, I utilize existing datasets compiled by Cass Sunstein and updated 
by Epstein, Landes, and Posner in 2013, as well as the Federal Judicial Center 
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biographical database to ascertain information on the sex and race of each judge.  This 
was accessed through Stata.  To supplement these sources, I also collected original data 
on citations to a sample of published majority opinions from these datasets. In all 
analyses that follow, the unit of analysis is at the individual level; that is, I do not 
examine panel effects.  
 Due to the limited scope of this study, a matching approach is used in order to 
compare cases.  For each category, observations were matched based on the opinion 
author’s gender, race, appointing party, decision year, and ideological direction of the 
decision.  A five-year window was used in order to count citations.  This approach allows 
for comparison of citations while holding constant competing explanations for 
differences in citations. 
 In order to gather citation counts for each case, I utilized LexisNexis Academic 
Database to look up cases about sex discrimination, abortion, and ADA cases in order to 
compare the number of citations received by different race-gender cohorts.2  I counted 
the total number of citations each judge received within their circuit, outside their 
circuit, and by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Only citing court decisions were counted; 
citations by law reviews, treatises, briefs, or periodicals were not used.  I considered 
positive and negative treatment for this project because even negative treatment could 
mean it was influential.  The categories positive and negative are assigned by Lexis and 
refer to the manner in which the cases were treated with respect to the case by which 
                                                          
2 For the purposes of this project, I use the distinctions “white” and “minority” rather than breaking down 




they were cited.3  Cases could be cited negatively in order to help the opinion author 
explain their rationale for why they disagree, but the author still had to consider the 
implications of the decision in order to decide if they agreed or disagreed with the 
rationale, demonstrating that it had some degree of influence. 
 Next, I discuss the variables used for the citation and decisional analyses. (Table 1 
in the appendix displays all coding rules for variables.)  First, a series of variables 
describes judicial characteristics (race, sex, and party), then case characteristics (cite, 
year, outcome, circuit, and issue area), and finally citation information (number of 
citations, outside circuit citations, and Supreme Court citations). Dummy variables for 
judge characteristics include those for the sex of the judge (male=0, female=1), race of 
the judge (white=0, nonwhite=1), and party of the nominating president4 (Democrat=1, 
Republican=0).  The “cite” variable is the case legal citation and “year” refers to the year 
the case was decided by the court.  A dummy variable indicates the direction of the case 
outcome (liberal=1, conservative=0).  Circuit was denoted with the circuit number with 
the D.C. circuit numbered as 12.  Abortion cases were coded with a “1,” sex 
discrimination as “2,” and ADA cases as “3.”  There are also indicators for whether or 
not cases cited by the U.S. Supreme Court and other district or appeals courts in the 
nation. If a case was cited out-of-circuit then it was coded with a “1,” while those cited 
                                                          
3 If a case received positive treatment in LexisNexis, it means that it has positive history.  This could 
include affirmation or denial of judicial review.  Furthermore, the case could have been followed by a 
minority opinion in the same circuit or a different circuit.  If a case received negative treatment, it means 
that judicial review or reconsideration was allowed or it was reversed by a higher court.  Subsequent 
courts could have disregarded the case or questioned the rationale behind the decision.  
4 For the purposes of this project, when I discuss Republican or Democratic judges it is to be assumed to 
be the party of the nominating president not the ideology of the judge.  The ideology of the judge is not 
available.  Furthermore, it should be noted that not every judge will vote in the same direction as the party 
of the nominating president.  There are exceptions.  For instance, Sonia Sotomayor was elevated to the 
appeals court by President George W. Bush (a Republican) but is a relatively liberal leaning judge. 
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in-circuit were given a “0.”  Similarly, if a case was cited by the Supreme Court it was 
coded as “1” and those that were not were given a “0.”  It is important to note that judges 
do not have to cite cases outside of their own circuit as those cases are not binding in 
their circuit.  Therefore, the cases that are cited from out-of-circuit are more 
“persuasive” for judges.5  Most comparable cases for each issue area were chosen from 
the same year; however, there were a few matched cases that were plus or minus three 
years from the original case. 
Results  
For all three issue areas, I took a sample of cases from the Sunstein dataset.  For 
the sex discrimination category (including pregnancy discrimination), there were thirty-
two cases.  Eight were written by minority women and had four conservative outcomes 
and four liberal.  The cases were then matched with cases with the same outcome 
authored by white men, minority men, and white women.  For abortion, all of the thirty-
six cases were authored by white males or females.6  Each case authored by a white 
female (eighteen total) was matched with a case authored by a white male within two to 
three years of the original case authored by a female.  There were three cases with a 
conservative outcome and fifteen cases with a liberal outcome and the original eighteen 
were matched with a case with the same outcome and party.  Lastly, there were also 
thirty-six ADA cases; however, these were more varied in terms of race.  There were nine 
cases authored by minority women (three liberal outcomes, five conservative) that were 
                                                          
5 “Persuasion” in this context can mean a judge agreed with a case from another circuit finding it 
convincing thus causing him to cite said case in support of his argument.  It could also mean the judge saw 
a flaw in the rationale of the case cited and used it in explanation of why he or she did not rule in the same 
manner. 




matched with white women, white men, and minority men depending on outcome 
(liberal or conservative).  In the cases studied, a liberal vote is one in favor on the 
plaintiffs for sex discrimination and ADA cases.  For abortion cases, a conservative vote 
means that the judge voted to restrict abortions and a liberal vote means that the judge 
voted to uphold previous standards.  I included ADA cases as a comparison category for 
the two women’s issue areas: sex discrimination and abortion.  
Beginning first with citations as an indicator of legal influence, I look at 
differences across issue areas.  Overall, sex discrimination cases had the highest overall 
average number of citations with an average of two hundred sixty-three.  Sex 
discrimination and ADA cases were most likely to be cited outside of the circuit but 
abortion cases were most likely to be cited by the Supreme Court.  
(See Figures 1.1- 1.6) 
 Next, I generated a series of box plots that shows the distribution of citations for 
cases written by various groups of judges.  In Figure 1.1., we see the distribution of 
citations in sex discrimination, broken down by judge gender.  Furthermore, we also see 
more variation in citations for women than men.  This can be seen in the inter-quartile 
range—for women the IQR is 602 citations with a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 
1,153 citations while the IQR for men is 130 with a minimum of five and a maximum of 
296.  Therefore, the IQR and minimum and maximum values for female judges is much 
greater than male judges.  (Note that the results for sex discrimination cases reflect that 
all cases in the sample were authored by Democratic judges).  In figure 1.2, we see 
minority women have an IQR of 670 with a minimum of 65 and a maximum of 1,153 
citations.  White women had an IQR of 408 with a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 
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656 citations.  These results suggest that the first hypothesis regarding female judges 
wielding more legal influence than men in the form of citations in sex discrimination 
and abortion cases is true, for sex discrimination cases.  Furthermore, the results 
suggest that while minority women have a higher number of citations than white 
women, this finding is not statistically significant.   
 In comparison, Figure 1.3 shows citations to majority opinions about abortion, by 
the sex of the opinion author.  For these cases, there were not statistically significant 
results.  Overall, the IQR was similar for male and female, with the median values much 
closer for these cases than sex discrimination (the median for male-authored cases was 
62 citations while the median for female-authored cases was 41 citations).  This 
demonstrates that women do not wield as much legal influence in terms of citations 
when they author the majority opinion for abortion cases compared to men.  This means 
that the first hypothesis was only supported in terms of sex discrimination cases.  Figure 
1.4 compares male and female judges within each party.  When analyzing Democratic 
females and Democratic males, the median for Democratic females was 39 while the 
median for Democratic males was 47 citations.  Republican women had a median of 44 
while Republican men had the highest median between both parties and sexes with 75 
citations.  Overall, there is more variation when comparing men in both parties.  Figure 
1.4 also shows that Republican men are cited more overall than female Republicans and 
male and female Democrats.  This suggests that my hypothesis stating women would be 
more influential when writing the majority opinion for abortion cases is not supported, 
as men in both parties are cited more often than women in both parties. 
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 Finally, Figure 1.5 shows citations by party and sex of majority opinion author for 
ADA cases, the comparison category.  As with sex discrimination cases, ADA cases only 
contain cases authored by Democrats.  The median for female-authored opinions was 
103 with an IQR of 240 citations while the median for men was 81 with an IQR of 147 
citations.  While there is some variation across gender, the variation is not statistically 
significant.  This demonstrates that men nor women wield more legal influence over the 
other for ADA cases.  This supports the hypothesis that differences would not be seen 
between men and women because disability discrimination is not gender salient.  In 
Figure 1.6, minority women and white women were also compared.  Overall, results 
comparing race and gender were statistically significant; minority women had a median 
of 286 citations while white females had a median of 90 citations.  This demonstrates 
that minority females are cited more often than their white counterparts with respect to 
ADA cases. 
 However, box plots are limited in their ability to help evaluate the hypotheses.  In 
order to determine whether or not there was a significant relationship between judge 
characteristics and citations, I performed difference-of-means tests (i.e., t-tests). I use 
this test in order to determine if the average number of citations for one group of judges 
is significantly different from the average of another group. If the “p-value” is less than 
0.05 then it is considered statistically significant (Acock 2016).  Tables 1 – 3 show the 
results from difference-of-means tests, beginning first with sex discrimination cases. 
[Table 1 here] 
For sex discrimination cases, the average number of citations is substantially 
higher for women than men (424, compared to 102).  Because the cases were all 
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authored by Democratic judges (there were not enough Republican judges for this 
comparison), the averages remained the same when party was added.  This difference is 
statistically significant, lending further support for part of the first hypothesis stating 
that women would be more influential in sex discrimination cases.  No sex 
discrimination cases in this study were cited by the Supreme Court.  In Table 1, race and 
gender were compared for females only.  Minority females had an average of 536 
citations while white females had an average of 312.  However, while minority females 
had more citations overall, this finding is not statistically significant.  In terms of sex 
discrimination cases, my hypothesis was supported.  Women (regardless of race) were 
more influential than men when they authored a sex discrimination case opinion.    
[Table 2 here] 
For abortion cases, Table 2 demonstrates there was no statistical significance 
between male and female citations, with an average for male judges of 70 citations and 
females 68 citations.  While this is not statistically significant, it should be noted that 
men are cited more often than their female counterparts.  Table 2 also breaks down 
averages between party and gender, again with no statistical significance.  However, it 
should be noted that Republican males had the highest average number of citations with 
124 citations and Democratic males had the lowest average with 60 citations.  This does 
not support the first hypothesis that stated female judges will be more influential than 
their male counterparts because males overall had a higher citation average than female 
judges.  As there were not enough minority authors for abortion cases, this area contains 
only white men and women. 
[Table 3 here] 
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Table 3 shows the average number of ADA citations (the comparison category) is 
not statistically significant with the average for women being 186 for females and 176 for 
males.  As with sex discrimination cases, this area contains opinions authored by 
Democratic judges as there were not enough Republican judges for a comparison.  This 
supports my first hypothesis as a difference between men and women was not expected 
because disability discrimination is not a gender salient issue.  Table 3 also 
demonstrates race and gender differences for females only, showing statistical 
significance in the average number of citations—minority females had an average of 263 
while white women had an average of 110 citations.  This shows minority females are 
cited more often than white women with respect to ADA cases.   
[See Tables 4-6] 
 Next, I ran cross-tabulations between judge characteristics and votes, using Chi-
squared tests.  I hypothesized that minority women would be more liberal in both sex 
discrimination and abortion, but did not find strong support for that expectation.  In sex 
discrimination cases, there was no significant difference between the number of liberal 
votes white and minority females cast (see Table 4).  Likewise, in abortion cases, there 
were no significant differences between white and minority female judges (see Table 5).  
In ADA cases, there was no statistical significance between minority and white female 
judges (see Table 6.).  With respect to sex discrimination and abortion cases, my 
hypothesis that minority women would be more likely to cast a liberal vote in these two 
areas did not find support. 
[See Tables 7-9] 
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 Last, this study examined voting by Republican and Democratic female judges in 
sex discrimination and abortion cases, with the expectation that voting will vary along 
party lines for abortion because it is more of a divisive partisan issue than sex 
discrimination.  This was also measured using cross-tabulations with a Chi2 test in 
order to determine statistical significance.  Following the conventions used in the 
literature, I use the party of the nominating president as a proxy for the party of the 
judge.   
Looking first at sex discrimination cases (Table 7), we see that Democratic 
females cast a liberal decision in sex discrimination cases 51% of the time while 
Republican women cast a liberal vote 38% of the time.  Republican women cast a 
conservative vote 61.3% of the time, while Democratic women cast a liberal vote 51.0% 
of the time. When broken down by party and gender, the results for Republican women 
and men are not statistically significant.  Likewise, for Democratic women and men, the 
results did not meet the threshold to be considered statistically significant (Table 7).  
Next, in Table 8, we see that abortion cases follow a similar pattern, with strong 
partisan differences between Republican and Democratic women.  Republican women 
cast a liberal vote in abortion cases only 40% of the time while their Democratic 
counterparts cast a liberal vote 71% of the time.  However, the results for gender within 
party were not statistically significant. 
With respect to ADA cases as the comparison category, the results for Republican 
females and Democratic females did not meet the threshold to be considered statistically 
significant.  However, when broken down by party and gender, Republican women cast 
a conservative vote 56% of the time while Republican men cast a conservative vote 69% 
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of the time.  That is, Republican women voted to protect the plaintiff in disability cases 
more often than their male counterparts.  For Democratic men and women, the results 
were not statistically significant. 
Discussion  
 The results from the sex discrimination analysis are supported by the 
informational account of judging and the feminist legal theory while abortion results are 
supported by the attitudinal model of judging.  Female judges possess unique and 
valuable information emanating from a shared experience that affected their ability to 
participate fully in the community.  Overall, women seem to be making strides on the 
bench; they went from fighting for a place on the bench to becoming influential judges 
specifically in terms of sex discrimination cases.  Women could wield more legal 
influence in terms of sex discrimination cases because historically they have more 
personal experiences with it than men.  However, females could come much further in 
terms of legal influence when voting on cases concerning other women’s rights issue 
areas such as abortion.  Female judges were much more likely to be cited within their 
own circuit and circuits throughout the country when they were the author of sex 
discrimination cases, but not abortion cases.  In fact, in the cases sampled, women did 
not even wield more influence in the Supreme Court for an issue (abortion) that can 
only affect females.  Furthermore, this study examined liberal and conservative women’s 
voting in sex discrimination and abortion cases and found there were strong partisan 
differences for abortion cases between Republican and Democratic females.  When 
analyzing male and female judges broken down by party, all Democratic appointees 
were more likely to cast a liberal vote than their Republican counterpart. 
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 My findings show that females were more influential than male judges in terms of 
the number of times they were cited for sex discrimination cases but not abortion cases.  
Therefore, the informational account that “women possess unique and valuable 
information emanating from shared professional experiences (Boyd, Epstein, and 
Martin 2010) is supported by the outcome for sex discrimination cases.    Overall, this 
study found other courts in surrounding circuits do not value female authored opinions 
concerning abortion over those written by a male, even though it is an issue specifically 
pertaining to women, but do value their opinions when authoring sex discrimination 
cases.  This discrepancy could be due in part to the strong partisan difference on 
abortion.  While there were statistically significant results for sex discrimination cases, 
the differences were not as large for sex discrimination cases as abortion cases which 
could indicate that polarization regarding sex discrimination cases is not as prevalent as 
it is for abortion cases.  Also, it should be noted that Republican women are at a 
disadvantage when analyzing the number of citations for abortion cases compared to 
Republican men because there are not as many Republican appointed females as 
Republican men. 
 The attitudinal model of judging can also help explain the results, especially for 
abortion.  While a degree of judicial impartiality is expected, judges are human beings 
with certain ideological and personal values that do not disappear when they vote on a 
case (Spaeth 2002).  This is true for an extremely polarized issue such as abortion and 
can help explain the divide between Republican and Democratic women.  Despite the 
fact that it is a woman’s issue, personal ideological values will come to light when 
deciding these cases.  This can also be true for sex discrimination cases as more 
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conservative votes were cast by Republican women (61.3%) and more liberal votes were 
cast by Democratic women (51.0%) suggesting that women do in fact divide along party 
lines for sex discrimination cases although not to the extent of abortion cases. 
 The feminist legal theory found some support in sex discrimination cases.  In 
these cases, it is not surprising that female judges voted in favor of the plaintiff because 
their case centers around discrimination based on sex in the workplace, school, or other 
institution inhibiting their ability to participate fully in society.   With respect to female 
judges deciding sex discrimination cases, their own personal experiences will shape 
their decision and authorship of opinion because they, unlike the majority of men, have 
had concrete experience with sex discrimination and will recall their own inability to 
move forward in their profession or schooling simply due to their sex.  Female authors 
may have been cited more for this exact reason: they once experienced sex 
discrimination whereas most men (not all, especially minority men) have been more 
removed from the effects of sex discrimination.  Therefore, other judges authoring 
opinions dealing with sex discrimination both in-circuit and out-of-circuit may choose 
to cite decisions authored by females more often because of personal female experience. 
   The race and gender non-finding is particularly interesting as the study 
conducted by Collins and Moyer in 2008 found that liberal women were more likely to 
cast a liberal vote in criminal cases.  If minority women were more likely to side with the 
defendant in criminal cases, then they could also be more likely to side with women 
claiming discrimination based on their sex, or women claiming their right to have an 
abortion has been infringed upon because these two issues areas where women as a 
whole have experienced discrimination and inequality.  This can be explored further 
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through the study of Obama’s minority women appointments.  I would expect results for 
sex discrimination and abortion cases to become statistically significant due to the influx 
of minority women Obama appointed during his two terms as president.  This could also 
mean women, regardless of race, are influenced by their similar discriminatory path to 
the bench. 
One limitation of this study is that it only examines a small window of time in 
judicial history, 1993 until 2008, and does not include the appointments of President 
Barack Obama.  To build on this thesis, researchers could use the same methods I 
employed by gathering citation counts in LexisNexis for cases beginning with President 
Carter’s appointees in the 1970’s through Barack Obama’s appointees in order to 
evaluate whether female judges’ influence has grown throughout the past 40 years.  
Additional research could also expand the women’s rights issues studied.  For instance, 
instead of simply addressing abortion, researchers could expand their focus to include 
reproductive health in general.  Furthermore, as (hopefully) more minority women are 
appointed to the bench, more could be done on intersectionality.  With so few minority 
women in this study, I choose to collapse African American, Latina, and Asian American 
women into the category “minority.”  If more minority women are appointed to the 
bench, then there will be more opportunities to parse differences across race-gender 
groups, as well as identify similarities in judicial decision making.  
In spite of these and other limitations, this study makes an important 
contribution to the literature on judicial decision making, by focusing on how female 
judges have come to be influential on the bench in terms of women’s rights issues.  This 
is important to study in order to demonstrate how the bench is no longer dominated by 
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men.  This study also highlights the importance of intersectionality and its effect on 
judging.  It is advantageous to study white and minority women because race in addition 
to sex may affect how a judge will vote on a particular case.  
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Notes:  * denotes p< .05 (two-tailed). For gender and party analysis, two-sample t(30) 
= 3.6, p = 0.001 (two-tailed).  For gender and race analysis, two-sample t(14) = -3.1, p = 
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Notes: * denotes p< .05 (two-tailed). For gender analysis, two-sample t(34) = .102, p = 
0.92 (two-tailed) For gender and party analysis, (Democratic) two-sample t(28) = -.3, p 
= .73 (two-tailed).  For gender and party analysis (Republican) two-sample t(4) = 0.8, p 
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Notes:  * denotes p< .05 (two-tailed). For party and gender analysis, two-sample t(34) 
= -0.14, p = 0.90. For gender and race analysis (females only), two-sample t(16) = -1.9, p 










Table 4:  Female judge race and voting in sex discrimination cases 
Two-way measure of association with Chi2 





















































Table 5: Female judge race and voting in abortion cases 
Two- way measure of association with Chi2 





















































Table 6: Female judge race and voting in ADA cases 
Two- way measure of association with Chi2 




















































Table 7: Judge vote and party of nominating president for sex 
discrimination cases 
Two- way measure of association with Chi2 

































































































Table 8: Judge vote and party of nominating president for abortion cases 
Two- way measure of association with Chi2 





































































































Table 9: Judge vote and party of nominating president for ADA cases 
Two- way measure of association with Chi2 





































































































Summary Chi2= 0.5 1,214 
(100%) 
























































Appendix: Code for Variables 
Cite By citation number 
Year By year 
Party Democrat= 1, Republican= 0 
Sex Female= 1, Male= 0 
Race Nonwhite= 1, White= 0 
Circuit 1-12, DC Circuit is numbered 12 
Category Abortion= 1, Sex Discrimination= 2, 
ADA= 3 
Outcome Liberal= 1, Conservative= 0 
Citations By number of citations  
Outside If cited outside the deciding circuit= 1, if 
not= 0 
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